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STRANGE JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC 
DEFENDER FUNDING CRISIS: PUNISHING THE INNOCENT 
SEAN D. O’BRIEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am grateful to have had one last opportunity to sit with Missouri Supreme 
Court Judge Richard Teitelman at the 2016 Richard J. Childress Memorial 
Lecture at Saint Louis University School of Law and listen to dedicated 
advocates address problems and issues arising from the ongoing crisis in 
Missouri indigent defense.1 
After the lecture, Judge Teitelman shared a personal story with former 
Saint Louis University Law School Dean Michael Wolff, his former colleague 
on the Supreme Court. Judge Teitelman authored the opinion that exonerated 
and freed Joseph Amrine from death row based on newly discovered evidence 
of his innocence, and Dean (then Judge) Wolff wrote a compelling 
concurrence.2 After his release from prison, Joe was invited to sit at the head 
table for the Legal Aid of Western Missouri Justice for All Luncheon with 
keynote speaker Sister Helen Prejean and dignitaries that included Judge 
Teitelman and his fellow Missouri Supreme Court Judge Ray Price. Judge 
Teitelman was overjoyed to meet Joe, and, as he did with everyone, asked Joe 
to call him “Rick.” After lunch, Judge Teitelman insisted that Joe pose for a 
picture with him and Judge Price, who had dissented in part from the decision 
granting Joe habeas corpus relief. Joe stood with a Supreme Court judge under 
each arm, and just before the shutter clicked, he said, “Wait ‘til the guys back 
on death row see this.” Judge Teitelman laughed as hard telling the story as he 
 
* Sean O’Brien is a Professor at University of Missouri - Kansas City School of Law, where he 
teaches criminal law and procedure. He served as the former Jackson County Public Defender 
from 1985–1990 and was a founding board member of the Midwest Innocence Project. 
 1. Presenters included ArchCity Defenders Co-Founder and Executive Director Thomas 
Harvey, Co-Founder and Director of Finance and Operations Michael-John Voss, and Staff 
Attorney and Skadden Fellow Blake Strode; Stephen Bright, President of the Southern Center for 
Human Rights; Missouri State Public Defender Michael Barrett; and the newly elected St. Louis 
City Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner. Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture 2016: Indigence and 
the Criminal Justice System, St. Louis University School of Law (Oct. 7, 2016), http://law.slu. 
edu/childresslecture2016 [http://perma.cc/Z8UV-8AUZ]. All had insightful views on the 
problems facing indigent defendants in Missouri. 
 2. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543–44 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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did when it happened. Judge Teitelman’s recognition of Joe Amrine’s 
humanity on and off the bench exemplifies who he was as a jurist and as a 
human being. He treated everyone with dignity, respect, and good humor. He 
will be sorely missed. It is timely for this article to recall his significant 
contributions to the protection of innocent prisoners who have not been well 
served by Missouri’s indigent defense system. 
Judge Teitelman’s decision that freed Joe Amrine is a good lens through 
which to view Missouri’s chronic indigent defense crisis. Joe is one of thirty-
eight innocent people in Missouri since 1989 to be wrongly convicted of 
serious crimes and later cleared by new evidence.3 Collectively, these men and 
women have served nearly a thousand years of unjust incarceration in Missouri 
prisons. Not every Missouri miscarriage of justice reported on the National 
Registry of Exonerations was defended by a public defender, and not every 
wrongful conviction is caused by defense attorney error. The Registry 
identifies inadequate legal defense as the cause of nearly one in four of these 
cases. However, systemic deficiencies such as those found to exist in the 
Missouri Public Defender System are undoubtedly contributing factors in 
many cases.4 After all, the Sixth Amendment “envisions counsel’s playing a 
 
 3. The National Registry of Exonerations is a joint project of the University of California 
Irvine Newkirk Center for Science and Society, University of Michigan Law School and 
Michigan State University College of Law that tracks cases of exonerations in the United States 
since 1989. To be included in the registry, a person must have been “convicted of a crime and 
later was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or agency with the 
authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal 
conviction by a government official or body with the authority to take that action.” Glossary, THE 
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
glossary.aspx [http://perma.cc/GCY4-3V84]. Missouri prisoners on the registry and the years 
they served include George Allen, Jr., thirty-two years; Joseph Amrine, seventeen years on death 
row; Antonio Beaver, seventeen years; James Bowman, fifteen years; Johnny Briscoe, twenty-
three years; Richard Buchli II, ten years; Darryl Burton, twenty-four years; David Clay, Sr., nine 
years; Eric Clemmons, fourteen years on death row; Clarence Richard Dexter, Jr., eight years on 
death row; Donald Dixon, sixteen years; Gary Engle, twenty years; Lonnie Erby, seventeen years; 
Russell Faria, two years; Ryan Ferguson, ten years; Reginald Griffin, fifteen years; Jennifer Hall, 
four years; Paula Hall, four years; Dale Helmig, fifteen years; Larry Johnson, eighteen years; 
Joshua Kezer, fourteen years; Ernest Leap, fourteen years; Cornell McKay, two years; Robert 
Nelson, nineteen years; Ellen Reasonover, sixteen years; George Revelle, two years; Jon Keith 
Smith, thirteen years; Patricia Stallings, one year; Zackary Lee Stewart, two years; James 
Strughold, two years; Antoine Terry, two years; Steven Toney, fourteen years; Armand Villasana, 
one year; Theodore White, Jr., seven years; Johnny Lee Wilson, ten years; Anthony D. Woods, 
eighteen years; Mark Woodworth, nineteen years; and Kenneth York, six years. See The NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
browse.aspx [http://perma.cc/GPG6-3MB9] (filtered by jurisdiction). 
 4. See Sean D. O’Brien, Missouri’s Public Defender Crisis: Shouldering the Burden Alone, 
75 MO. L. REV. 853, 857 (2010) (reviewing the history of the Missouri Public Defender System, 
which was created in 1973, ten full years after Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
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role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just 
results.”5 It is impossible to know how many of the other miscarriages of 
justice caused by mistaken identification, false confessions, misleading 
forensic evidence, or official misconduct might have been prevented by a 
vigorous defense. But the innocence phenomenon, which saw a record number 
of exonerations in 2015,6 provides an important backdrop to the examination 
of Missouri’s indigent defense funding crisis. 
I.  INNOCENT VICTIMS OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER CRISIS 
Judges, journalists, scholars, and Missouri Bar presidents have written 
much about Missouri’s chronic indigent defense crisis, all urging more money, 
more lawyers, more training, more resources.7 Few, however, consider what a 
system in crisis looks like from the client’s perspective. The most thorough 
assessment came from the late Robert Spangenberg, one of the foremost 
experts in the United States on indigent defense systems. In a study 
commissioned by the Missouri Bar, Spangenberg called the Missouri Public 
Defender System’s caseload crisis “one of the worst of its kind in the nation,” 
and said the system was “on the brink of collapse,” providing only “the illusion 
of a lawyer.”8 New lawyers receive “little hands-on supervision,” and judges 
 
mandated the appointment of counsel for all persons accused of felony offenses, and which has 
been chronically underfunded since its inception). 
 5. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 6. THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015, at 3 (Feb. 3, 2016), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/2Q5F-UYRJ]. 
 7. See Douglas A. Copeland, The President’s Page: Missouri’s Public Defender System, 62 
J. MO. B. 10, 10–11 (2006); Laura Denvir Stith, Chief Justice Delivers 2009 State of the 
Judiciary Address, 65 J. MO. B. 62, 63–64 (2009); James McKay, The Bar Speaks, 62 J. MO. B. 
162, 162 (2006); Bill McClellan, Reasonover Win of Lawsuit Raises Some Old Questions, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2004, at B1; CATHLEEN BURNETT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
CLEMENCY APPEALS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 63–99 (2002). 
 8. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP & THE CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y AT GEO. MASON 
U., ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM 64, 66 (2009), www.nla 
da.net/sites/default/files/2009%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Missouri%20State%20Public% 
20Defender%20System%20(TSG).pdf [http://perma.cc/ED6Y-2UJH] [hereinafter SPANGENBERG 
ASSESSMENT]. The Spangenberg Assessment was criticized for not arriving at specific caseload 
and funding projections. Allison Retka, Missouri State Public Defender System Study Criticized 
as Inadequate, MO. LAW. MEDIA, Nov. 23, 2009. Spangenberg, on the other hand, cautioned that 
“the results only provide an accurate description of a system in crisis. Any reliance on these 
numbers, even as a baseline from which to develop appropriate caseload standards, would only 
serve to institutionalize an already crippled system.” SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT at 41. The 
Spangenberg Group concluded that the Missouri Public Defender System is “the most poorly 
funded of all the state public defender systems in the country.” Id. at 33. Because the system is so 
underfunded, Spangenberg recommended adding substantial new resources and support staff 
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expressed concerns that high turnover results in new attorneys handling a 
significant caseload of serious cases for which they were simply not ready.9 
This produces “a crop of attorneys faced with crushing caseloads who ‘do not 
know what effective representation is’ due to a crippling lack of experience 
and supervision.”10 Defenders described a system of triage in which some 
clients were neglected in order to adequately defend others.11 Violations of 
performance and ethical standards were institutionalized; the practice of “meet 
’em and plead ’em” was not only commonplace but expected.12 In 2009, 
Missouri public defenders could only spend an average of 7.7 hours on each 
case, including death penalty cases.13 To cope with staggering law school debt 
and low salaries, some defenders work second jobs delivering pizza, working 
retail, tending bar, or driving trucks.14 It is doubtful that clients are consistently 
getting quality representation under these conditions. 
II.  GUTTING THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE SAFETY NET: THE JOSEPH AMRINE 
CASE 
Few would dispute the proposition that the execution or incarceration of an 
innocent person is the definitive failure of the criminal justice system. 
Certainly, it fails in other ways; defense attorney error and prosecutorial 
misconduct are serious problems that contribute to unfair sentences, erosion of 
constitutional rights, and public disrespect for the justice system.15 While there 
is argument about the extent of these problems, no one would seriously suggest 
that innocence is irrelevant. In examining the Missouri defender system, 
conviction of the innocent is the canary in the coal mine. It happens all too 
often, but the judicial safety net is not what it should be in a jurisdiction with a 
chronically underfunded indigent defense system. Few prisoners have adequate 
resources to overcome daunting hurdles to proving their innocence.16 
 
before attempting to assess resource and workload issues necessary for adequate representation. 
Id. at 46, 52. 
 9. SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 10. Id. at 30. 
 11. Id. at 8. 
 12. Id. at 23. 
 13. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc). 
 14. SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 15. 
 15. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), http://www.a 
mericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_
right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q29H-ZK7Z]. 
 16. Successful exoneration efforts in Missouri invariably require the generosity of counsel 
who undertake massive pro bono effort to sift through mountains of documents and fund 
extensive investigation into the charges against the client. For prisoners seeking relief from unjust 
convictions, finding such a lawyer is like winning the lottery. Examples include Robert Ramsey 
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Joseph Amrine’s experience illustrates Spangenberg’s findings. In his 
wrongful conviction for the murder of Gary Barber in the Missouri 
Penitentiary in 1985, Amrine was defended by Cole County Public Defender 
Julian Ossman, whose incompetence in the defense of prisoners facing the 
death penalty has been written about by legal scholars.17 Amrine is the second 
of Ossman’s clients to be sentenced to death and then exonerated after many 
years on Missouri’s death row.18 In two other death penalty cases, courts found 
Ossman constitutionally ineffective, but those judgments were set aside 
because of procedural technicalities created by deficient representation on the 
part of public defenders in subsequent appeals, and those clients were put to 
death both because of and in spite of incompetent representation.19 In yet 
another case, the issue of Ossman’s deficient performance was procedurally 
barred by the inept performance of his public defenders appointed to represent 
 
and Michelle Puckett’s tireless work that freed Mark Woodworth, State ex rel. Woodworth v. 
Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); years of pro bono work by Cheryl Pilate on 
behalf of Daryl Burton, Burton v. Dormire, No. 06AC-CC00312 (Cole Cty., filed Aug. 18, 2008); 
the generosity of Kansas City mortgage banker James B. Nutter, Jr., who funded much of the 
author’s expenses incurred in Joseph Amrine’s exoneration, State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 
S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); and the work of Charles Weiss and his firm, Bryan Cave, 
that proved the innocence of Josh Kezer, Kezer v. Dormire, No. 08AC-CC00293 (Cole Cty., filed 
Feb. 17, 2009). These efforts are now supplemented by the support of the Cardozo Innocence 
Project, who worked with Bryan Cave in the exoneration of George Allen, State ex rel. Koster v. 
Green, 388 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), and the Midwest Innocence Project, operating in 
conjunction with the University of Missouri-Kansas City and University of Missouri Law School 
Wrongful Convictions Clinics to assist the author and Kansas City attorney Bronwyn Werner in 
the exoneration of Dale Helmig. State ex rel. Koster v. McElwain, 340 S.W.3d 221, 227 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2011), and to assist Illinois attorney Kathleen Zelner in the exoneration of Ryan Ferguson. 
Ferguson v. Dormire, 413 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). The vast resources, generosity and 
dedication of these organizations, law firms, and attorneys is but a drop in the bucket in 
relationship to the need. The Midwest Innocence Project, with a staff of two lawyers, currently 
has over six hundred pending requests for assistance. See MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
TheMIP.org/about [http://perma.cc/V9MU-WVDJ]. 
 17. See WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN 
CAPITAL CASES 186–87 (2006) [hereinafter WHITE, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS] (discussing in detail 
Ossman’s deficient defense of Ricky Zeitvogel who was executed in Missouri on December 11, 
1996); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, SEARCHABLE EXECUTION DATABASE, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions [http://perma.cc/DKS2-WMYX] [hereinafter 
DPIC DATABASE]. 
 18. See Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 956 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting Eric Clemmons a 
new trial because of Ossman’s deficient performance, and acquitting him). See THE NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, ERIC CLEMMONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera 
tion/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3110 [http://perma.cc/U3NB-UMDN]. 
 19. Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1039 (8th Cir. 1995); Bolder v. Armontrout, 921 F.2d 1359, 
1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1990). Emmet Nave was executed on July 31, 1996; Martsay Bolder was 
executed on Jan. 27, 1993. DPIC DATABASE, supra note 17. 
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him on his post-conviction motion.20 Amrine himself came perilously close to 
execution because of similar neglect by Ossman and public defenders who 
represented him in subsequent state post-conviction proceedings. 
One of the obstacles facing people in Joe Amrine’s situation is the lack of 
teeth in the Strickland v. Washington21 standard for proving that trial counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective. The late Professor Welsh S. White noted that 
under Strickland, it has become “increasingly clear that defense attorneys’ 
representation of capital defendants was sometimes shockingly inadequate.”22 
The American Bar Association found that Strickland failed to protect against 
widespread problems with legal services for indigent defendants, even in death 
penalty cases.23 Professor White criticized Strickland for permitting courts to 
affirm unjust convictions and sentences based on trial counsel’s weak claims of 
“trial strategy,” and for allowing subjective determinations that the prisoner 
has not met his burden of proving that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
deficient performance.24 Another major obstacle to enforcing the right to 
competent counsel is the lack of effective post-conviction counsel to 
investigate and develop claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.25 So 
Joe Amrine’s burden of proving that Ossman’s performance was 
constitutionally deficient was formidable, notwithstanding Ossman’s abysmal 
track record. 
Ossman’s conduct of Amrine’s defense is consistent in every way with 
Spangenberg’s description of a system in crisis. What little investigation he 
conducted was untimely; Ossman interviewed defense witnesses for the first 
time in the hallway during the trial with the jury waiting in the box.26 He did 
 
 20. Zeitvogel v. Delo, 84 F.3d 276, 278, 281 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing habeas corpus review 
because “the blame for Zeitvogel’s procedural default falls squarely on Zeitvogel’s 
postconviction counsel”). 
 21. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 22. WHITE, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, supra note 17, at 3. Professor White found cases in 
which trial counsel who were in the parking lot while the key prosecution witness was on the 
stand, who referred to an African-American client as “nigger,” or who stipulated to all of the 
elements of first degree murder plus two aggravating circumstances were constitutionally 
adequate under Strickland. Id. 
 23. See Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death 
Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 13, 16 (1990) 
 24. WHITE, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, supra note 17, at 17–19. 
 25. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 
174, 185 (2011); cf., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 
 26. When defense witness Brian Strothers came to court, Ossman asked the trial court to 
wait while he told Strothers why he was subpoenaed to the courthouse. Ossman admitted, “I’ve 
never talked to this guy before.” Transcript of Record at 627, Amrine v. Ossman, No. 08AC-
CC00340, at 627 (Cole Cty., Nov. 5, 2012). 
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not object to Amrine being displayed to the jury in shackles and leg irons.27 
Ossman did not object when State’s witness Terry Russell blurted out, falsely, 
that he had passed a polygraph test.28 He failed to cross-examine jailhouse 
informants about glaring inconsistencies in their stories.29 He did nothing to 
prepare for the penalty phase of trial; Joe Amrine’s mother first learned of the 
trial when she read about her son’s death sentence in the newspaper. Although 
the federal court “agree[d] with the district court that Amrine’s counsel did not 
fulfill his obligation to investigate adequately,” consistent with Professor 
White’s criticism of Strickland, the court concluded, “Nevertheless, Amrine 
has not shown that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s deficient 
performance.”30 Amrine’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
denied because he could not establish, to the court’s satisfaction, “a reasonable 
probability that, absent [the counsel’s unprofessional] errors, the factfinder 
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”31 In hindsight, it can be 
said with certainty that Strickland failed to protect an innocent person from a 
concededly incompetent lawyer. The Strickland standard has offered indigent 
defendants little protection at all against Ossman’s serial incompetence. 
As Amrine’s appeals were moving through the court system, the jailhouse 
informants who testified against him recanted their testimony one by one. The 
first recantation by Randy Ferguson was rejected because the other two, Terry 
Russell and Jerry Poe, stood by their stories.32 Russell’s subsequent recantation 
was also rejected as not credible, and Poe’s trial testimony stood 
unimpeached.33 During Amrine’s appeal from the denial of his federal habeas 
petition, Poe was finally located, and he admitted that his trial testimony 
 
 27. Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Amrine I]. Cf. 
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005). 
 28. Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo. 1990) (en banc). 
 29. State’s witness, Jerry Poe, told investigators that he saw Amrine sneak up behind Gary 
Barber, stab him in the back, and run away with the knife in his hand. Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 
F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Amrine II]. State’s witness Randy Ferguson testified 
that Amrine and Barber were walking side-by-side, talking to one another, when Amrine pulled a 
knife from his waistband and stabbed Barber, leaving the knife in Barber’s back as he ran away. 
Id. The jury heard only Ferguson’s version of events. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1031. 
 31. Id. at 1030 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
 32. State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665, 675 (Mo. 1987) (en banc). 
 33. Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Shortly after his 
testimony against Amrine, Russell was released from prison and was returned to prison a few 
months later on a conviction for murder. Id. at 1224 n.6. Amrine’s new evidence implicated 
Russell in Barber’s murder. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc). Judge Wolff observed that Russell was never a good witness for either side. “The question 
is: which time were these three witnesses lying? When they testified against Amrine, or when 
they recanted? . . . . What we do know is that all three witnesses—upon whom Amrine’s 
conviction and sentence of death solely depend—are liars.” Id at 550 (Wolff, J., concurring). 
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implicating Amrine was false. Amrine’s case was remanded for a hearing on 
Amrine’s claim of actual innocence.34 
III.  INNOCENCE AS A GATEWAY THROUGH PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES 
Courts have historically constrained the litigation of innocence to the trial 
of the case, heeding Justice Rehnquist’s philosophy that the trial is the main 
event: 
To the greatest extent possible all issues which bear on this charge should be 
determined [at trial]: the accused is in the courtroom, the jury is in the box, the 
judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly 
sworn, await their turn to testify. Society’s resources have been concentrated at 
that time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the 
question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.35 
Consistent with that philosophy, state and federal courts have limited the post-
conviction litigation of innocence to narrow circumstances. The problem in 
Missouri, of course, is that society’s resources have not been concentrated at 
the time and place of trial, at least not as far as the defendant is concerned. 
Tensions between federal and state sovereignty have spawned a complex, 
arcane system of procedural technicalities that enable courts to avoid deciding 
a prisoner’s imperfectly litigated constitutional claims. However, the Supreme 
Court made clear in 1963 that procedural bars must give way when “the ends 
of justice” require it.36 Thirty-two years later, the Court used a Missouri case 
alleging ineffective assistance of appointed counsel to find the “ends of 
justice” test satisfied by a colorable claim of actual innocence. In Schlup v. 
Delo, trial counsel assigned by the public defender to defend Schlup did not 
speak to multiple witnesses known to have seen a murder.37 However, as in 
Amrine, post-conviction counsel did not perform the investigation that trial 
counsel had failed to do, so Lloyd Schlup’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel arrived in federal court procedurally encumbered and without facts to 
support it. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Schlup’s habeas 
corpus petition, effectively “tell[ing] Lloyd Schlup in regard to his conviction: 
You may indeed be innocent, but you are not innocent enough early enough.”38 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s 
judgment denying habeas corpus review to Lloyd Schlup, creating what is now 
known as the “gateway” claim of actual innocence: even if a prisoner’s 
constitutional claims are procedurally barred, if “it is more likely than not that 
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 
 
 34. Amrine I, 128 F.3d at 1230. 
 35. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). 
 36. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963). 
 37. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 307 (1995). 
 38. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 754 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
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evidence,” then the federal court “cannot have confidence in the outcome of 
the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 
constitutional error.”39 Schlup’s case was remanded and resolved in a two-step 
process consistent with the Court’s ruling: First, Eastern District of Missouri 
Presiding Judge Jean Hamilton, after a hearing, determined that Schlup’s new 
evidence showed a reasonable probability that no reasonable juror would find 
him guilty.40 However, the inquiry could not end there; that finding only 
permitted Judge Hamilton to determine whether Schlup’s trial was free of 
harmful constitutional error. At a second hearing, Judge Hamilton found that 
Schlup’s appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to interview known 
eyewitnesses to the crime, and issued the writ of habeas corpus.41 This 
illustrates the operation of Schlup’s innocence gateway to habeas corpus relief, 
which, has led to the release of other Missouri prisoners who were convicted, 
in spite of innocence, after unconstitutional trials.42 The Schlup doctrine is 
grounded in the principle that habeas corpus is an equitable remedy, and “the 
ultimate equity on the prisoner’s side [is] a sufficient showing of actual 
innocence.”43 
A safety net for innocent prisoners is indisputably necessary in a state with 
a chronically underfunded public defender system. Unfortunately, the safety 
net is full of holes. Proof of a reasonable probability of innocence is a high 
threshold, reserved for “highly unusual case[s].”44 Even if the prisoner can 
meet the innocence threshold, the toothless Strickland standard still stands in 
the way. One would think that a person who was convicted in spite of 
innocence could show that he or she had an unfair trial, but that is not always 
the case. The low threshold for adequate performance and the high threshold 
for showing prejudice has obstructed the release of prisoners like Amrine who 
could prove their innocence. For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that Daryl Burton was probably innocent, but under Strickland’s 
subjective standard the court felt compelled to find that he had a fair trial. The 
court wrote, “Burton’s habeas petition troubles us because his legal claims do 
 
 39. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316, 327. 
 40. Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 455 (E.D. Mo. 1995). 
 41. Schlup v. Bowersox, No. 4:92CV443 JCH, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8887, at *45 (E.D. 
Mo. May 2, 1996). 
 42. See, e.g., Reasonover v. Washington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 937, 981 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Kezer v. 
Dormire, No. 08AC-CC00293, at *44–45 (Cole Cty., filed Feb. 17, 2009); Burton v. Dormire, 
No. 06AC-CC00312, at *42 (Cole Cty., filed Aug. 18, 2008). 
 43. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 44. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 341–42. 
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not provide him an adequate foundation upon which to present his considerable 
claims of factual innocence.”45 
The Eighth Circuit in subsequent decisions has rendered Schlup incapable 
of reaching a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Amrine I, the court 
put a gloss on Schlup’s innocence gateway that requires the prisoner to come 
forward with “new” evidence, and “[t]he evidence is new only if it was not 
available at trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the 
exercise of due diligence.”46 The court drew the “due diligence” requirement 
from earlier decisions addressing substantive claims based only on free-
standing claims of newly discovered evidence.47 In Ellen Reasonover’s case, 
Judge Jean Hamilton provided a hypothetical to explain the absurdity of 
Amrine’s rule: 
A habeas petitioner presents a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which 
is procedurally barred. The petitioner is unable to establish cause and 
prejudice. The petitioner presents compelling evidence of actual innocence, but 
all the evidence was available at the time of trial and could have been 
discovered in the exercise of due diligence. Further, petitioner presents 
evidence that the available evidence was not utilized because of trial counsel’s 
lack of diligence. 
Under the Eighth Circuit’s definition of new evidence, the petitioner’s Schlup 
claim must fail, notwithstanding the compelling evidence of actual innocence. 
Under Amrine, the evidence presented by the petitioner is not “new,” and 
therefore may not be considered by the habeas court. The petitioner’s claim 
would be procedurally barred, and the habeas court would be precluded from 
ruling on the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
In contrast, under Schlup, the evidence presented by the petitioner is “new” 
because it was “not presented at trial.” Assuming that the new evidence is 
reliable and sufficient to sustain the petitioner’s burden under Schlup, the 
habeas court must consider the merits of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance 
 
 45. Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 849 (8th Cir. 2002). The court “express[ed] the hope 
that the state of Missouri may provide a forum (either judicial or executive) in which to consider 
the mounting evidence that Burton’s conviction was procured by perjured or flawed eyewitness 
testimony.” Id. Burton was ultimately freed, but only after the Eighth Circuit’s timid ruling cost 
an innocent man an additional six years of his life. Burton v. Dormire, No. 06AC-CC00312, at 
*42–43 (Cole Cty., filed Aug. 18, 2008). Ironically, Burton was found innocent and released by 
Cole County Circuit Judge Richard Callahan, the same man who had prosecuted Lloyd Schlup. 
Id. 
 46. Amrine I, 128 F.3d at 1230 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. (citing Bannister, 100 F.3d at 610, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) and Smith v. Armontrout, 888 
F.2d 530, 542 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
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of counsel claim because failure to do so would result in a “fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.”48 
Judge Hamilton noted that in Schlup itself, the Supreme Court 
characterized witness testimony as “‘new statements,’ even though the 
information in those statements was available at the time of trial and could 
have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”49 Thus, the outcome in 
Schlup itself would have been different if the Eighth Circuit standard was 
correct. Because the Court clearly intended actual innocence to prevent legal 
technicalities from obstructing remedies for constitutional violations that 
render a conviction unworthy of confidence, no other circuit in the county 
follows the Eighth Circuit’s Amrine standard.50 
Judge Hamilton’s warning has come to fruition in subsequent cases in 
which the Eighth Circuit has allowed trial counsel’s ineffectiveness to defeat a 
gateway innocence claim where actual innocence is asserted to reach a 
procedurally barred claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ricky Kidd 
alleged that his Missouri public defender was ineffective for failing to 
investigate and present evidence that he was innocent; public defenders 
assigned to represent him on appeal and post-conviction did not investigate 
Mr. Kidd’s innocence, and abandoned Mr. Kidd’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. The only path to prove that Missouri violated Kidd’s 
constitutional right to counsel was through Schlup’s innocence gateway—a 
door that the Eighth Circuit firmly slammed shut in Kidd’s face.51 
Kidd was charged with the homicides of George Bryant and Oscar Bridges 
that occurred in broad daylight and was witnessed by neighbors who saw three 
men get in a new, white Oldsmobile and flee the scene.52 The police 
investigation produced air fare, hotel and car rental records showing that three 
 
 48. Reasonover v. Washington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 937, 949–50 n.8 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (internal 
citations omitted). Ellen Reasonover was freed after sixteen years of wrongful imprisonment 
because she invoked the Schlup gateway to reach a defaulted claim that the Missouri concealed 
exonerating evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Ellen 
Reasonover, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ex 
oneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3564 [https://perma.cc/YL8P-YVY9]. 
 49. Reasonover, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 948–49. Fortunately for Ellen Reasonover, “[t]he 
evidence which was available, but not presented at trial, . . . strengthens, but is not essential to, 
Petitioner’s successful showing of actual innocence.” Id., at 950. 
 50. Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t would defy reason to block 
review of actual innocence based on what could later amount to the counsel’s constitutionally 
defective representation.”); Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 94 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“the rule that 
Amrine sets forth requires a petitioner, such as Houck, in effect to contend that his trial counsel 
was not ineffective because otherwise the newly presented evidence cannot be new, reliable 
evidence for Schlup purposes”). See also Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961–62 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 51. Kidd v. Norman, 651 F.3d 947, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 52. Id. at 948, 951. 
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men, Marcus Merrill, Gary Goodspeed, Sr., and Gary Goodspeed, Jr., all 
related to one another, flew from Atlanta to Kansas City a few days before the 
murder, rented a car matching the description of the getaway car, rendezvoused 
at the Adam’s Mark Hotel the morning of the crime, and returned to Atlanta a 
few days later.53 All three gave statements placing themselves in one another’s 
company, with no third party alibi, at the time of the offense.54 None 
mentioned Ricky Kidd.55 No documentary or physical evidence implicated 
Kidd in the crime, and his shoes were excluded as the source of a bloody 
footprint on the victims’ kitchen floor.56 The only evidence against Kidd at 
trial was Richard Harris, who portrayed himself as a neighbor who happened to 
walk past the house as the homicide was taking place.57 Harris identified Kidd 
as the shooter and Gary Goodspeed, Jr., as an accomplice.58 Curiously, 
Goodspeed was never charged. 
The Spangenberg assessment noted that one of the many detrimental 
effects of the public defender funding crisis is that “[w]ork on some cases 
would not begin until the trial date was near.”59 The failure of Kidd’s alibi 
defense reveals why and how procrastination in the defense preparation harms 
public defender clients. When questioned separately eight days after the crime, 
Kidd and his girlfriend said that they were together all day on February 6, 
1996.60 They drove downtown to collect Kidd’s car keys form his sister at her 
employer’s, and then went to the Sheriff’s Department to register a handgun.61 
Police obtained the gun permit application, which was dated February 6, 
1996.62 Kidd was released pending further investigation, and was charged 
three months later. Kidd’s public defender did not preserve video footage from 
the employer’s surveillance cameras, and waited over a year to talk to alibi 
witnesses.63 Nor did she attempt to interview the deputy who placed her badge 
number on Kidd’s gun permit application.64 Consequently, the unimpeachable, 
irrefutable portions of Kidd’s alibi were lost to time. 
The public defender’s procrastination exposed Kidd’s alibi witnesses to 
avoidable attack: Kidd’s sister could not remember a year later whether she 
 
 53. Id. at 951. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Exhibits in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 650, In re Kidd v. Conlee, 
No. 1516-CV05073 (Jackson Cty., Mar. 6, 2015). 
 57. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 948. 
 58. Id. 
 59. SPANGENBERG ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 8. 
 60. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 948. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 951. 
 64. Id. 
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took the bus home from work that day, or her brother gave her a ride.65 
Another witness who was not interviewed for a year was questioned how she 
could possibly remember the date a year later.66 Frustrated that his lawyer was 
not preserving his alibi, Kidd called witnesses himself from the county jail, and 
those witnesses were challenged for colluding with Kidd.67 The prosecutor 
claimed the sheriff’s gun permit could have been received by mail.68 The case 
is a compelling demonstration of the inability of an overburdened public 
defender system to develop and present a truthful defense. Even if Kidd’s 
family and his sister’s coworkers were telling the truth, their credibility could 
not withstand the attacks occasioned by the public defender’s delay. In 
essence, Missouri prosecutions may be alibi-proof if the defendant is 
represented by an overburdened public defender. 
Kidd’s habeas counsel developed significant evidence to support a claim of 
actual innocence as a gateway to Kidd’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel that was procedurally barred when his post-conviction lawyers did no 
investigation. The testimony of the deputy who processed Kidd’s gun permit 
“confirmed Kidd’s application was received the same day as the shootings.”69 
He also developed substantial evidence impeaching Richard Harris, the only 
witness who tied Kidd to the crime: 
This evidence includes Harris’s drug connections to Bryant, his use of 
marijuana at the time of the shootings, the inconsistencies between Harris’s 
description of the shooter’s appearance (the shooter “had a head of hair” and 
“wasn’t bald-headed at the time”) and Kidd’s appearance (it is undisputed 
Kidd’s head was shaved completely bald at the time of the shootings), and the 
inconsistencies between Harris’s description of the shootings and other 
eyewitnesses who did not see Harris outside Bryant’s home at the time.70 
Habeas counsel also established that “Harris frequently used drugs with 
Bryant, and Harris was upset with Bryant because Bryant wanted to kill 
Harris’s best friend.”71 Habeas counsel produced another witness, Eugene 
Williams, who “place[d] Merrill and the two Goodspeeds together the morning 
of the shootings.”72 The Court further noted that “Williams also connect[ed] 
Merrill and the Goodspeeds to the weapons used in the murders, and knew the 
three men were going to rob someone that morning.”73 Finally, Marcus Merrill 
 
 65. Transcript on Appeal at 1148, State v. Kidd, No. CR96-2137 (Jackson Cty., filed Dec. 2 
1997) (on file with the author). 
 66. Id. at 1169–70. 
 67. Id. at 1182. 
 68. Id. at 1164–65. 
 69. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 951. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 950. 
 72. Id. at 951. 
 73. Id. 
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testified that he committed the robbery along with the Goodspeeds, and Kidd 
was not involved in the crime at all.74 
Even though new evidence proved that the state’s main witness was 
unbelievable, that Kidd’s alibi was truthful, and established the identity of the 
real killers, Kidd could not satisfy the Eighth Circuit’s impossible 
interpretation of the Schlup standard. The court acknowledged that “Amrine 
has been criticized when the procedurally defaulted claim which a petitioner 
hopes to resurrect under Schlup is an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 
against trial counsel for not discovering and presenting the exculpatory 
evidence that proves the petitioner’s innocence.”75 Nevertheless, the court held 
that “the district court correctly interpreted Amrine as requiring Kidd to come 
forward not only with new reliable evidence which was not presented at trial, 
but to come forward with new reliable evidence which was not available at 
trial through the exercise of due diligence.”76 As long as Amrine’s holding 
persists, federal habeas corpus offers no protection to innocent public defender 
clients who are convicted because of incompetent defense. 
IV.  IS INNOCENCE AN ADEQUATE REASON TO RELEASE A PRISONER? 
Exonerations based on DNA evidence provide a rich pool of reliable data 
about causes of wrongful convictions. To no one’s surprise, the type of 
evidence that correlates most strongly with the conviction of innocent 
defendants is eyewitness identification testimony.77 What should a court do if a 
conviction is grounded on an honest but mistaken eyewitness identification 
that is credited by a jury at a trial that is otherwise “fair?” Is there a remedy for 
that prisoner? That issue is on its way to the Missouri Supreme Court in the 
case of Rodney Lincoln.78 First, a little history. 
As Lloyd Schlup’s habeas corpus petition was percolating through the 
federal system, Leonel Herrera was attempting to use lingering doubts about 
 
 74. Kidd, 651 F.3d at 949. Merrill’s testimony was discounted by the court because of 
Merrill’s hope that cooperation with the prosecution could reduce his life sentence. Id. at 950. 
 75. Id. at 952. 
 76. Id. at 953. The flaw in the Eighth Circuit’s Amrine actual innocence standard should 
have been clear in Amrine itself, where the Missouri Supreme Court found that the evidence 
which the Eighth Circuit refused to consider “met [Amrine’s] burden of providing clear and 
convincing evidence of actual innocence that undermines our confidence in the correctness of the 
judgment.” State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 77. According to the Innocence Project, “Eyewitness misidentification is the greatest 
contributing factor to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing, playing a role in more than 
70% of convictions overturned through DNA testing nationwide.” Eyewitness Misidentification, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/eyewitness-misidentification/ 
[http://perma.cc/NDH5-V2H2]. 
 78. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, WD79854, 2016 WL 5888944, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 
2016). 
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his guilt to prevent his impending execution in Texas. Unlike Schlup, all of 
Herrera’s constitutional issues had been ruled against him; innocence was all 
he had left. Herrera was scheduled to be executed February 19, 1992,79 and 
Schlup was scheduled to be executed in March 1992.80 Schlup’s stay of 
execution came from the lower courts to sort out his gateway claim of 
innocence, and Herrera’s stay came after the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to decide whether it violated the Eighth Amendment to execute an innocent 
person.81 Herrera’s claim of innocence was not as strong as Schlup’s, but it 
was nevertheless plausible.82 Since the rejection of Herrera’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and other trial error had already been rejected, 
the viability of his innocence claim was the sole remaining issue. 
The Court did not look kindly upon Herrera’s innocence evidence, but did 
not close the door on a sufficiently meritorious innocence claim in the future. 
No single rationale carried a majority of the Court. Justice Blackmun, joined 
by Justices Stevens and Souter, would have remanded the case for a hearing on 
whether Herrera could “show that he probably is innocent.”83 Justice White 
would grant relief in such cases if the prisoner’s evidence shows that “no 
rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”84 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, disagreed, asserting 
that “[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have 
never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an 
independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal 
proceeding.”85 
Somewhere in the middle of this three-to-one-to-three division, Justice 
O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, acknowledged that “the execution of a 
legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable 
event[;]” however, Herrera was “not innocent, in any sense of the word.”86 
Therefore, she concluded: 
[T]he Court has no reason to pass on, and appropriately reserves, the question 
whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of actual innocence. 
 
 79. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1030 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 80. Sean O’Brien, Mothers and Sons: The Lloyd Schlup Story, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1021, 
1031–32 (2009). 
 81. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 82. Herrera’s innocence evidence included an affidavit of an attorney that Herrera’s brother 
Raul, who died in 1984, had admitted that he, not Leonel Herrera, was the killer. Also, Raul 
Herrera’s cell mate submitted an affidavit that Raul Herrera had confessed to him as well. 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 396. 
 83. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 
(1979)). 
 85. Id. at 400. 
 86. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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That difficult question remains open. If the Constitution’s guarantees of fair 
procedure and the safeguards of clemency and pardon fulfill their historical 
mission, it may never require resolution at all.87 
The State of Texas executed Leonel Herrera on May 12, 1993.88 
Missouri’s dysfunctional defender system provides the perfect soup for the 
scenario that Justice O’Connor described: the Constitution’s guarantees of fair 
procedure and safeguards of clemency and pardon do not fulfill their historical 
mission. Amrine was the first post-Herrera test of Missouri courts’ power to 
correct the conviction of an innocent person. After the federal courts refused to 
consider the bulk of the evidence supporting his innocence and rejected his 
Schlup gateway claim of actual innocence, Joe Amrine petitioned the Missouri 
Supreme Court for habeas corpus relief, asserting a free-standing claim of 
actual innocence. Predictably, the State “asserted in its brief, and in oral 
argument, that Mr. Amrine had no right to additional review, whatever the 
nature of his current claims and whatever the strength of the evidence 
supporting them.”89 At the oral argument of Amrine’s case, Missouri Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Laura Denvir Stith asked counsel for the State, “Are you 
suggesting, . . . even if we find that Mr. Amrine is actually innocent, he should 
be executed?”90 The Assistant Attorney General answered, “That’s correct, 
your honor.”91 Judge Stith later wrote that even though commentators were 
shocked at this answer, 
I was not. That was the only answer he could give in light of the legal position 
taken by the State of Missouri in opposing Mr. Amrine’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. If a state high court has no authority to review a claim of actual 
innocence, then it follows that it is powerless to prevent the prisoner’s 
execution.92 
 
 87. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427. After Herrera, the Court stayed the execution of Troy Davis 
and ordered a hearing on his innocence claim. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009). Davis was 
executed, amid great controversy, after a federal judge concluded that Davis’ evidence was not 
sufficiently persuasive. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 
2010). See Kim Severson, Davis Is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/us/final-pleas-and-vigils-in-troy-davis-execution.html 
[http://perma.cc/WW76-Y6WD]. The Court continues to assume, for the sake of argument, that a 
prisoner who received a fair trial could nevertheless obtain habeas corpus relief under an 
“extraordinarily high” standard if evidence establishes that he is “unquestionably” innocent. 
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315–17 (1995). See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) 
(“House’s showing falls short of the threshold implied in Herrera.”). 
 88. Leonel Herrera, THE DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/leonel-herrera [http://perma.cc/GZ5U-6S9S]. 
 89. Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority To Grant Habeas 
Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421 (2004). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 421–22. 
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The Missouri Attorney’s General argument in Amrine was grounded in 
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Herrera. Noting that much of Herrera’s 
reasoning was driven by the federalism concerns that limit the jurisdiction of 
federal courts, the Missouri Supreme Court in an opinion authored by the late 
Honorable Rick Teitelman, declined to follow Herrera in determining the 
reach of Missouri’s habeas corpus remedy: 
In other words, as Herrera recognized, even if a federal court were found not 
to have jurisdiction to review a state conviction and sentence in the absence of 
a federal constitutional issue, this would not deprive a state court from 
reviewing the conviction and sentence if its own state habeas law so permitted. 
The issue now before this Court, then, is whether, in the words of Herrera, 
Missouri has left a “state avenue open to process such a claim.” This Court 
finds that it has done so. Having recognized the prospect of an intolerable 
wrong, the state has provided a remedy.93 
The court noted that the federal courts’ Schlup analysis “did not consider 
Amrine’s other evidence, including the recantations of Russell and Ferguson, 
because that evidence was not new,” and that “[t]his Court is the first forum in 
which all of the existing evidence of innocence will be considered.”94 
On the same body of evidence that had been presented to, but ignored by, 
the federal courts, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Amrine “has met his 
burden of providing clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence that 
undermines our confidence in the correctness of the judgment,” and therefore 
was entitled to habeas corpus relief.95 In so holding, the court noted that it is 
not “required to impose as high a standard as would a federal court in 
reviewing a freestanding claim of actual innocence, for, as discussed, this 
Court is not affected by the federalism concerns that limit the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to consider non-constitutional claims of actual innocence.”96 Given 
the systemic deficiencies in Missouri’s public defender system, and the 
Missouri Attorney’s General apparent indifference to executing or 
incarcerating the innocent, the narrow protection that Amrine provides to 
prisoners who are clearly actually innocent is essential—even if the trial is 
declared to have been “fair.”97 
Yet Missouri continues to struggle with innocence claims. Recently, an 
intermediate appellate court declined to apply Amrine to a habeas petitioner 
challenging a life sentence. Rodney Lincoln was convicted of a grisly crime—
 
 93. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546–47 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 545. 
 95. Id. at 548. 
 96. Id. 
 97. After reading the opinion in his own case, Amrine himself asked the author, “How can 
they say I had a fair trial if I got convicted when I was innocent?” 
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the April 1982 murder of JoAnn Tate and the brutal stabbing of her two 
daughters, then ages four and seven—based on the identification of the seven-
year-old, corroborated only by a microscopic hair comparison “matching” 
Lincoln to a hair found at the scene of the crime.98 In 2014, after DNA proved 
that the hair did not come from Mr. Lincoln, the Eastern District Court of 
Appeals nevertheless denied Lincoln’s DNA motion for release because the 
child “never wavered” in her identification of Lincoln.99 
Lincoln subsequently brought a habeas corpus petition supported by 
evidence neutralizing all of the state’s evidence. The child witness, now in her 
forties, spontaneously reported to the prosecuting attorney that she was 
mistaken in her identification of Mr. Lincoln, and explained how she was 
manipulated by an exceedingly suggestive identification process.100 Coupled 
with the DNA exclusion, her recantation makes Lincoln’s case factually 
indistinguishable from Amrine’s, “in which no credible evidence remains from 
the first trial to support the conviction.”101 The only evidence from Lincoln’s 
trial that still stands today is his alibi defense, supported by his family and his 
employer, that he left home after a good night’s sleep and arrived at work at 
the usual time that morning. 
Unfortunately for Lincoln, the court of appeals disavowed its power to 
release innocent people. The court interpreted Amrine as recognizing “a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence in cases where the death penalty has 
been imposed because the prospect of executing an innocent person, in the face 
of clear and convincing evidence of innocence, is a manifest injustice.”102 
Oddly, the court did not see incarceration for life for a crime one did not 
commit as a manifest injustice. “Until the Supreme Court announces that a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence is a recognized basis for securing 
habeas relief because either the continued incarceration or eventual execution 
of an actually innocent person violates principles of due process, we have no 
authority to presume that Missouri’s habeas jurisprudence permits such a claim 
in a non-death penalty case.”103 In other words, clear and convincing evidence 
 
 98. Lincoln v. State, 457 S.W.3d 800, 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 99. Id. at 803–04. Evidence withheld by the prosecution established that this assumption was 
false. See text infra at notes 104–05. 
 100. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, WD79854, 2016 WL 5888944, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 
2016). The victim-witness has sided with Lincoln in his legal efforts to win release. Jennifer 
Mann, Victim Recants ID That Put Man in Prison for Mother’s Murder in St. Louis in 1982, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/vic 
tim-recants-id-that-put-man-in-prison-for-mother/article_503a9500-b913-5a2f-b655-ff822f62f9 
17.html [http://perma.cc/9F4U-5YGF]. 
 101. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 548. 
 102. In re Lincoln, WL5888944 at *6 (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at *8 (emphasis in original). 
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of innocence is not a legally adequate ground for habeas corpus relief in 
Missouri, according to the court of appeals. 
In addition to his free-standing claim of innocence, Lincoln raised a claim 
based on the prosecutor’s concealment of evidence that the child had fearfully 
pointed to other men, including the prosecutor, and called them the “bad man,” 
which is how she referred to her attacker.104 The prosecutor also failed to 
disclose that the child had participated in multiple rehearsals of her testimony, 
during which she was coached on where the “bad man” would be seated, and 
to remember to refer to the “bad man” as Rodney Lincoln.105 As in the case of 
Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a petitioner must prove that 
concealed evidence is material to the outcome of the trial, a standard which is 
essentially the same as Strickland’s prejudice prong.106 Just as Professor White 
warned, the malleable and subjective outcome-oriented standard enabled the 
court of appeals to conclude that even though the concealed evidence “would 
have provided [Lincoln] with even more ammunition to support the line of 
questioning in fact undertaken at trial, we are not persuaded that [Lincoln] did 
not receive a fair trial in the absence of this supplemental impeachment 
material.”107 Thus, Rodney Lincoln joins Daryl Burton in meeting Schlup’s 
actual innocence standard, and yet enduring continued incarcerated because, 
based on Strickland’s subjective outcome-based standard, his trial was “fair.” 
Apparently there is no equity for innocent Missouri prisoners who are not 
sentenced to death, no matter how compelling their evidence is. 
As this article is being written, Lincoln and the victim-witness in his case 
are asking the Missouri Supreme Court to accept transfer of the case, and to 
extend Amrine’s holding to prisoners condemned to die in prison of natural 
causes.108 The question remains whether Missouri Courts have the power to 
correct a manifest injustice when it becomes apparent. To a lay person, the 
term “manifest injustice,” the cornerstone of Missouri habeas corpus 
jurisprudence, should make this a simple question to resolve. It is difficult to 
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imagine a free society in which it is not considered a manifest injustice to 
imprison an innocent person. 
CONCLUSION 
Mistakes do happen. Joe Amrine survived his representation by the public 
defender system, but only after enduring seventeen years of hell on death row. 
He owes his freedom today to a mountain of effort by volunteer lawyers, law 
students, and the generosity of a Kansas City mortgage broker who generously 
paid tens of thousands of dollars of litigation expenses for Amrine’s 
exoneration. All of this effort would have been for naught but for the vision 
and humanity of Judge Rick Teitelman. I met with Joe Amrine to share the 
news of the good judge’s passing. Joe shook his head slowly, his eyes 
moistened and he said, “They said he was supposed to be blind, but he saw 
more than a lot of judges. And he sure saw me. He saw me.” Hopefully Judge 
Teitelman’s important contribution to Missouri habeas corpus jurisprudence in 
the Amrine case will continue to protect glaring miscarriages of justice such as 
Amrine’s, Kidd’s and Lincoln’s. 
Where to go from here? I have previously proposed a solution for public 
defender funding that seems to have worked well in the federal system: adopt a 
mandatory system of parity in which prosecutor and defender caseloads, 
resources and salaries are funded equally in proportion to one another.109 
Moderate criminal sanctions so that the destruction of a client’s life is not 
always the inevitable consequence of error by appointed counsel.110 Restore a 
role for private counsel in the delivery of indigent defense services as an 
essential safety valve for excessive defender workloads.111 Implement the 
American Bar Association’s recommendations for managing a system in crisis, 
including recommendations to relax procedural technicalities.112 And preserve 
Rick Teitelman’s vision of justice that gives Missouri courts the power and 
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